We study the problem of Bayesian learning in a dynamical system involving strategic agents with asymmetric information. In a series of seminal papers in the literature, this problem has been investigated under a simplifying model where myopically selfish players appear sequentially and act once...

We consider a finite horizon dynamic game with two players who observe their types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as independent, controlled linear Gaussian processes and players incur quadratic instantaneous costs. This forms a dynamic linear...

"The descent of working class movements that began with neoliberal globalization is nearing completion. However, the ascent is yet to begin. This period is witnessing novel forms of organization and resistance. For students, activists and academics, it is imperative to understand changes in the...

We consider a demand management problem in an energy community, in which several users obtain energy from an external organization such as an energy company and pay for the energy according to pre-specified prices that consist of a time-dependent price per unit of energy as well as a separate...

We consider an environment where a finite number of players need to decide whether to buy a certain product (or adopt a trend) or not. The product is either good or bad, but its true value is not known to the players. Instead, each player has her own private information on the quality of the...

We consider a demand management problem in an energy community, in which several users obtain energy from an external organization such as an energy company and pay for the energy according to pre-specified prices that consist of a time-dependent price per unit of energy as well as a separate...

We consider a dynamic game with asymmetric information where each player privately observes a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world V, resulting in dependent private observations. We study the structured perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBEs) that use private beliefs in their strategies as...

In this paper, we present a sequential decomposition algorithm to compute graphon mean-field equilibrium (GMFE) of dynamic graphon mean-field games (GMFGs). We consider a large population of players sequentially making strategic decisions where the actions of each player affect their neighbors...

In this paper, we consider the notion of -robust equilibrium for finite strategic players in anonymous games, where utility of a player depends on other players' actions only through the resulting distribution of actions played. This equilibrium is defined as the set of strategies of the players...