Using a large sample of U.S. bank loan data from 1996 to 2008, we investigate the relation between two auditor characteristics, namely, auditor size and tenure, and loan interest rates. Our results show the following: First, we find that the loan interest rate is significantly lower for...

Using a sample of 21,608 firm-years from 34 countries during 1998–2004, this study evaluates the impact of voluntary adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on a firm’s implied cost of equity capital. We find that the implied cost of equity capital is significantly...

We examine the association between real earnings management and the cost of new bond issues of U.S. corporations. We consider three types of real earnings management: sales manipulation, overproduction, and the abnormal reduction of discretionary expenditures. We find that overproduction impairs...

type="main" xml:id="acfi12026-abs-0001" <title type="main">Abstract</title> <p>Using firms from 20 non-US countries, we investigate whether and how ownership structure, analyst following and country-level institutions influence stock price informativeness (SPI). We find that stock price informativeness decreases with...</p>

Using a sample of non-U.S. firms from 22 countries during 2003–2007, we examine the effect of firm-level governance on various features of loan contracting in the international loan market. We find that banks charge lower loan rates, offer larger and longer-maturity loans, and impose fewer...

We investigate the effect of board governance and takeover protection on real earnings management. Four types of real earnings management are considered: sales manipulation, overproduction, the abnormal reduction of research and development (R&D) expenses, and the abnormal reduction of other...

Recent research suggests that insiders’ incentives for capturing cash flows affect price formation process in which insiders are inclined to withhold good news and to accelerate the release of bad news (Jin and Myers, 2006). We investigate whether insiders’ incentives for private control...