-extraction and cooperation shocks trigger short-run adjustments in the agents' behaviour. However, shocks do not have permanent … effects. This explains the long-run resilience of cooperation to rent extraction. We also show that cooperative attitudes and …

-extraction and cooperation shocks trigger short-run adjustments in the agents' behaviour. However, shocks do not have permanent … effects. This explains the long-run resilience of cooperation to rent extraction. We also show that cooperative attitudes and …

-extraction and cooperation shocks trigger short-run adjustments in the agents’ behaviour. However, shocks do not have permanent … effects. This explains the long-run resilience of cooperation to rent extraction. We also show that cooperative attitudes and …

that cooperation breeds trustworthiness and vice versa and that one-time disruptions are particularly damaging in settings …, contributors and administrators establish a stable interaction with cooperation matching the level from a comparable Public Goods …

any independent effect on cooperation in a public good game. The results show that, for given marginal incentives … contributions. Moreover, obligations per se cannot sustain cooperation over time, even if they affect the rate of decline of average … contributions. Finally, unexpected changes in the minimum contribution have asymmetric dynamic effects on the levels of cooperation …

Revealing the identities of contributors has been shown to increase cooperation in public goods games. In this paper we … computer chat. The results confirm the positive effect of identification on cooperation among individuals. For groups, however …

that cooperation breeds trustworthiness and vice versa and that one-time disruptions are particularly damaging in settings …, contributors and administrators establish a stable interaction with cooperation matching the level from a comparable Public Goods …