We study firms' corporate governance in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for...

In a principal-agent model we analyze the firm's decision to adopt an informal or a standardized environmental management system (EMS). Our results are consistent with empirical evidence in several respects. A standardized EMS increases the internal control at the cost of introducing some degree...

We build a principal-agent model to analyze the firm's decision to adopt an environmental management system (EMS) and the EMS type, either informal (I) or standardized (S), such as ISO 14001. Our results are consistent with empirical evidence in several respects. A standardized EMS increases the...

Taking advantage of a card-scanning system that records individual, real-time data on the use of bio-waste sorting bins, we run a randomized field experiment to analyze the effectiveness of soft commitments in promoting participation in waste sorting. Being given the offer to sign a soft...