This paper investigates the impact of monitoring institutions on market outcomes in health care. Health care markets are characterized by asymmetric information. Physicians have an information advantage over patients with respect to the appropriate treatment for the patient and may exploit this...

Intrinsic motivation and monetary incentives affect an expert's choice of firm, and thus also the performance of the firm. These effects are particularly important for consumers of credence goods in mission industries, where experts perform duties that align with their own personal belief...

We study a repeated credence goods market in which experts provide treatment to customers. We assume that the history of transactions is recorded on a biased review platform that contains information only about treatments, and not about non- treatments. We also introduce the notion of a partial...

Credence goods markets are prone to fraudulent behavior and market inefficiencies due to informational asymmetries between sellers and customers. We examine experimentally the effects of diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage on the information acquisition and provision decisions by...

In markets for credence goods - such as health care or repair services - fraudulent behavior by better informed experts is a common problem. Our model studies how four common features shape experts' provision behavior in credence goods markets: (i) diagnostic uncertainty of experts; (ii)...

In markets for credence goods - such as health care or repair services - fraudulent behavior by better informed experts is a common problem. Our model studies how four common features shape experts' provision behavior in credence goods markets: (i) diagnostic uncertainty of experts; (ii)...