Regulatory reform had its beginnings in the United States in the 1970s, and today it is taking place around the globe. One of the central questions for industrial policy is how to regulate firms with market power. Regulatory Reform tackles this important policy issue in two parts: it describes...

We analyze the incentives of a vertically integrated firm, which is a regulated monopolist in the wholesale market and competes with an entrant in the retail market, to invest and to give access to a new wholesale technology. The new technology represents a non-drastic innovation that produces...

The aim of this paper is to highlight empirically some important worldwide differences in the impact of privatization of the fixed-line telecommunications operator on network expansion, tariffs, and efficiency during the 1985-2007 period for a large panel of countries. Our work suggests that the...

The study analyzes the regulatory need of a functional or structural separation of the Swiss incumbent Swisscom.

The study develops and assesses models to implement a national FTTH network.

Is the gradual introduction of facilities-based competition, by fine-tuning access regulation, working as intended? What can one learn from the Dutch experience? More than a decade has passed since the liberalization of telecommunications in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the regulator is still...

We analyze the incentives of a telecommunications incumbent to invest and give access to a downstream entrant to a next generation network. We model the industry as a duopoly, where a vertically integrated incumbent and a downstream entrant, that requires access to the incumbent's network,...

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires incumbent monopoly phone companies to lease elements of their networks to rivals. An important policy question is whether these unbundled elements are substitutes for entry modes that are more facilities-based. In this article, we estimate demand...

We analyze if two-part access tariffs solve the dynamic consistency problem of the regulation of Next Generation Networks. We model the industry as a duopoly, where a vertically integrated incumbent and a downstream entrant, that requires access to the incumbent's network, compete on Hotelling's...