This paper studies the effects of government capital accumulation on sovereign debt default risk and debt restructuring renegotiation outcomes when government has limited ability to extract revenues from households. We develop a quantitative dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of...

This paper shows that the optimal sovereign lending contract is state-contingent when a government can default. It provides a theoretical basis for the specification of optimal state-contingent debt instruments (SCDIs) in countries subject to large shocks that can be observed and verified by all...

A sovereign's inability to commit to a course of action regarding future borrowing and default behavior makes long-term debt costly (the problem of debt dilution). One mechanism to mitigate the debt dilution problem is the inclusion of a seniority clause in sovereign debt contracts. In the event...

A sovereign's inability to commit to a course of action regarding future borrowing and default behavior makes long-term debt costly (the problem of debt dilution). One mechanism to mitigate the debt dilution problem is the inclusion of a seniority clause in sovereign debt contracts. In the event...

How do oil price movements affect sovereign spreads in an oil-dependent economy? I develop a stochastic general equilibrium model of an economy exposed to co-moving oil price and output processes, with endogenous sovereign default risk. The model explains a large proportion of business cycle...

This chapter is on quantitative models of sovereign debt crises in emerging market economies. We interpret debt crises broadly to cover all of the major problems a country can experience while trying to issue new debt, including default, sharp increases in the spread and failed auctions. We...

In this paper we empirically explore the relationship between debt and output in a panel of 72 countries over the period 1970-2014 using a vector autoregression (VAR). We document two puzzling empirical findings that contrast with what is predicted by a standard small open economy model by...

A traditional explanation for why sovereign governments repay debts is that they want to keep good reputations so they can easily borrow more. Bulow and Rogoff show that this argument is invalid under two conditions: (i) there is a single debt relationship, and (ii) regardless of their past...