This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We study secure …

Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, in the case of on-campus housing for …, we introduce a model of house allocation with overlapping agents. In terms of dynamic mechanism design, we examine two …-proofness. We provide another simple dynamic mechanism that is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. -- house allocation …

We search for impartiality in the allocation of objects when monetary transfers are not possible. Our main focus is … introducing randomization to object allocation problems is almost inevitable for achieving impartiality. …

"optimal" envy-free allocation by maximally manipulating the solutions. This maximal manipulation theorem leads to several …

random allocations from deterministic allocation mechanisms. Insights from the two-sided matching theory and the recent … break the ties using a lottery and randomize over deterministic allocation mechanisms. Such randomizations usually lead to …-ante fair solution. Ex- ante fair random allocations are generated using "allocation by division", a new method of generating …

We consider house allocation problems (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) with strict preferences. We introduce a new axiom …