In this paper we attempt to compare theoretically and experimentally three models of strategic information transmission. In particular we focus on the models by Crawford & Sobel (1982), Lai (2010) and Ehses-Friedrich (2011). These three models differ in the information that the receiver...

It is commonly believed that borrowers cannot be anonymous in unsecured credit relations because anonymity heavily reduces the scope for punishment and therefore makes credit unfeasible except for very special circumstances. However, we demonstrate that credit is generally feasible even if...

We present a three-person, two-period bargaining game with private information. A single proposer is seeking to secure agreement to a proposal under either majority or unanimity rule. If the first period proposal fails, the game ends immediately with an exogenously given "breakdown" probability....

Principal-agent models take outside options, determining participation and incentive constraints, as given. We construct a general equilibrium model where workers' reservation wages and the maximum punishment acceptable before workers quit are instead determined endogenously. We simultaneously...

This paper explores whether professional macroeconomic forecasters manipulate their forecasts to influence voting outcomes. We model a referendum in which a voter chooses between two policies. The voter relies on a forecaster to learn about the macroeconomic consequences of the policies. The...

This paper develops a mechanism design approach to study externalities and re-distribution. The mechanism screens individuals’ social weights to strike a balance among broad distributional objectives, incentives to work, and incentives to reduce externalities. The welfare-optimal allocation...

We investigate how heterogeneous social preferences affect the communication of painful information in social relationships. We characterize the existence conditions for a pooling equilibrium in which individuals conceal painful information because revealing the latter would signal that they are...

Indicated key external and internal threats have a profound effect on the process of ensuring the financial security of the enterprise. Therefore, the important step is the application the mechanism of counteraction to the influence of external and internal threats. The mechanism for countering...

Künstliche Intelligenz (KI) scheint den derzeitigen Rechtsrahmen infrage zu stellen, wenn Regeln aus einer analogen Welt auf Rechtsfragen des digitalen Zeitalters angewendet werden. Dies macht sich insbesondere dann bemerkbar, wenn KI-Systeme Schäden verursachen. Die akademische...

The authors of the article point out that the theory of economics has failed to yield a solid theoretical background in such critical situations as the transformational period of post-communist economies and the period of the current financial and economic crisis. While classical liberal or...