The market for Internet search is not only economically and socially important, it is also highly concentrated. Is this a problem? We study the question whether 'competition is only a free click away'. We argue that the market for Internet search is characterized by indirect network...

This paper discusses the relationship between the data economy and economic development and examines the benefits and challenges for emerging economies. In particular, it examines the market concentration and offers some reasoning for why we should expect that the data economy may end up...

There is vigorous debate over the ability of the current antitrust enforcement regime in the United States to protect against potential reductions in competition caused by large technology companies. Some commentators have argued that current antitrust rules and processes cannot address...

I model access to influence as a two-sided matching market between a continuum of experts and two vertically differentiated gatekeepers under sequential directed search. Real-world examples include academic publishing, venture capital, job search or political agenda setting. The equilibrium is...

Advertisers seek to maximize profits by investing in advertising. We propose a “cost-per-incremental-action” (CPIA) pricing model which incorporates the causal contribution of advertising in order to achieve the advertisers' objectives such as profit maximization. CPIA pricing aligns...

Market power on each side of a multisided platform, whether in the form of increasing prices or decreasing quality, is constrained by the risk of losing sales on the other sides. That tends to weaken market power on each side and encourages platforms to keep prices lower and quality higher than...

The market for Internet search is not only economically and socially important, it is also highly concentrated. Is this a problem? We study the question whether "competition is only a free click away". We argue that the market for Internet search is characterized by indirect network...

I model access to influence as a two-sided matching market between a continuum of experts and a finite number of gatekeepers under sequential directed search. Real-world examples include academic publishing, venture capitalism or political agenda setting. Uniqueness of the resulting equilibrium...