We study the impact of Dead Hand Proxy Puts on shareholder value. Courts and commentators have characterized these terms as defenses against hedge fund activism that threaten to reduce firm value by entrenching underperforming managers and thereby increasing managerial agency costs. Our findings...

This study investigates whether CEO perquisite of borrowing firms plays any significant role, both in terms of price and non-price settings, in financial contracts and reveals that lending banks demand significantly higher return (spread), more collateral, and stricter covenants from firms with...

Using a large sample of loans initiated by firms targeted by hedge fund activists during 1994-2008, we show that hedge fund activism has significant impacts on firms' bank loan contracts. After the targeting announcement, and relative to firms that are not targeted, the targeted firms pay...

We look at the reaction to hedge fund activism of managers and shareholders in Japanese firms and explore the implications of our findings for agency theory. We use a qualitative research design which treats the standard agency-theoretical model of the firm as only one possible approach to...

This article aims to investigate whether institutional investors aid in lowering the cost of debt using a sample of 311 nonfinancial firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) over 2011-2020. All data were obtained from the SETSMART database. Controlling for firm characteristics,...

Existing research on CEO turnover focuses on CEO ability. This paper argues board ability is also important. Corporate boards will be reluctant to replace CEOs as this makes financing expensive by sending a negative signal about board ability. This differs from existing literature: entrenchment...

This paper investigates two elements of agency costs, namely the wealth transfer and the value destruction problems, associated with the equity-conversion and writedown CoCo bonds. By focussing on the costs as those stemming from the deviation from absolute priority rule (DAPR), we derive the...