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of evidence that independent director reputation incentives influence the supply of director services. These reputation … incentives vary across firms and over time, significantly influencing important board decisions and firm outcomes. When more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974592
and bondholder-aligned CEO compensation components, particularly when CEOs have greater incentives to take and shift risk …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849311
of aligning managers' interests with those of shareholders. We also document that future changes to equity …-based incentives are related to voting outcomes and that shareholders incorporate CFO incentives into their votes. Collectively, these … evidence that shareholders tend to approve of compensation packages that are more sensitive to changes in stock price (pay …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903167
This paper investigates the effects of board of director collusion on managerial incentives and firm values. Recent … governance policies, such as managerial pay, and curbing competition. We study a model where managers can exert unobservable cost …-cutting effort and investigate the consequences of and the incentives for coordinating managerial pay among corporate boards …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013119061
This paper investigates the effects of board of director collusion on managerial incentives and firm values. Recent … governance policies, such as managerial pay, and curbing competition. We study a model where managers can exert unobservable cost …-cutting effort and investigate the consequences of and the incentives for coordinating managerial pay among corporate boards. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011734901
it can destroy the ex ante efficient trade-off between risk and incentives under the presence of renegotiation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011429999
This paper analyzes how board independence affects a board's monitoring intensity and the CEO pay disparity. We consider a corporate tournament model with a novel feature that the board of directors may lack independence. This has significant implications for a board's monitoring and rewarding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012972652
(CEO) relative inside leverage to proxy for the incentives of risk-averse managers, we find that CEOs with higher inside …We provide evidence concerning the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on merger and acquisition (M … leverage are more likely to engage in vertical mergers, and those mergers generate lower announcement returns for shareholders …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974548
Understanding CEO compensation plans is a continuing challenge for directors and investors. The disclosure of these plans is dictated by SEC rules that rely heavily on the “fair value” of awards at the time they are granted. The problem with these numbers is that they are static and do not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011870307
Previous literature shows that securities litigation is positively impacted by management compensation with a focus on the delta, but not the vega, component of compensation. We argue that the vega, rather than the delta, component of management compensation should be associated with litigation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013232780