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Boards of directors face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. To perform these tasks directors do not have detailed information about executives' behaviour, and only infrequently have information about the success or failure of initiated strategies, reorganizations, mergers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349199
This paper presents a real-options model of entrenchment in which a CEO chooses how much effort to put into boosting a firm's productivity and the board and CEO bargain over executive-compensation and investment policies. The surplus that bargaining allocates derives from the reduction in value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014352326
decreasing firm risk. The mechanisms that transmit incentives to decisions and decisions to risk appear to be more conservative … clawback policy, appears to benefit shareholders …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012107693
, generally implicit assumption that managers cannot undo their incentive packages, (ii) the standard modeling practice of … motives in managers' portfolio choices. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013411812
-binding SOP votes may provide shareholders with a mechanism to influence director incentives, and therefore, executive … preferences for monitoring executive compensation. When shareholders express disapproval through low Say-On-Pay (SOP) support … shareholder support for reelection, and decreased directorial compensation. Shareholders at firms sharing an affected director …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012943723
This paper examines the SEC regulation requiring non-binding general shareholder vote on executive compensation–“say-on-pay” (SOP). We examine the first two years of SOP in the Russell 3000. The results confirm previous shareholder-proposal studies by finding that SOP approval (reject)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036020
theory predicts that institutional investors' incentives and capabilities to monitor CEO pay are determined by the fiduciary … firms because they do not have the same monitoring incentives and capabilities. Using a longitudinal sample of S&P 1500 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142420
This paper studies how managerial compensation is shaped by the risk preference of shareholders. Firms with a large …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012848455
CEO equity incentives, and higher valuations. These effects are substantial and robust. Our findings imply that by making … it easier for blockholders to obtain a board seat, proxy access rules or bylaws can benefit shareholders …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012906210
This paper investigates the role external advice plays in the board's determination of CEO compensation. We show that CEO incentive pay increases with the degree of compensation consultant independence using a quasi-natural experiment provided by the creation of an independent consultant after...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012861088