We model a two-tiered market structure in which an investor can trade an asset on a trading platform with a set of dealers who in turn have access to an interdealer market. The investor's order is informative about the asset's payoff and dealers who were contacted by the investor use this...

We augment a simple inventory model with new features of the post-crisis regulations to offer new predictions on the effects of post-crisis regulations on the over-the-counter markets. First, the increased capital requirements of Basel III lead to an overall increase in order rejection rates of...

A large number of financial assets are traded in both exchanges and over-the-counter markets (i.e., centralized and decentralized markets, CM and DM hereafter, respectively). Moreover, as documented by Biais and Green (2019), the 20th century has witnessed a secular migration of asset trade from...

Decentralized markets attract large amounts of trade volume, even though they exhibit frictions absent in centralized exchanges. We develop a model with asymmetric information and expertise acquisition where some traders try to exploit any market structure to inefficiently screen their...

We propose a parsimonious model of bilateral trade under asymmetric information to shed light on the prevalence of intermediation chains that stand between buyers and sellers in many decentralized markets. Our model features a classic problem in economics where an agent uses his market power to...

We study specialized lending in a credit market competition model with private information. Two banks, equipped with similar data processing systems, possess "general" signals regarding the borrower's quality. However, the specialized bank gains an additional advantage through further...

We develop a parsimonious model to study the equilibrium structure of over-the-counter securities markets. We show that regulations aimed at reducing counterparty risk and improving liquidity can be ineffcient. Such regulations have a direct positive effect on entry in those markets, thus...

We develop a parsimonious model to study the equilibrium structure of financial markets and its efficiency properties. We find that regulations aimed at improving market outcomes can cause inefficiencies. The welfare benefit of such regulation stems from endogenously improving market access for...

We consider a model in which dealers intermediate trades between clients and provide immediacy, or, market liquidity. Dealers can exert unobservable effort to improve the chance of intermediating profitably. This moral-hazard friction impairs dealers' ability to raise external finance and hence...