In many organizational contexts, managers might have self-serving incentives whereby giving high evaluations to … employees comes at the expense of their own payoff. In this study, I examine the impact of managers’ self-serving incentives on …-serving incentives collect less information than managers with no self-serving incentives. When managers do collect all available …

This paper shows that in a model of managerial delegation in duopoly market structure, if the managers' salary varies … the proportion of the incentive scheme that the managers get as a part of their salary, i.e. in equilibrium owners will …

firm risk, even in the presence of strong risk taking incentives. Our results are robust to controls for the sensitivity of … CEO wealth to stock price changes, firm risk determinants, the endogenous feedback effects of firm risk on CEO incentives …

This paper investigates the effects of board of director collusion on managerial incentives and firm values. Recent … governance policies, such as managerial pay, and curbing competition. We study a model where managers can exert unobservable cost …-cutting effort and investigate the consequences of and the incentives for coordinating managerial pay among corporate boards …

deliberately provide managers with risk-taking incentives to address risk-related agency conflicts and these incentives do not … effects of managers' stock holdings by showing that these incentives vary based on firms' value-risk tradeoffs … managers' incentive compensation packages. I find that shareholder value increases with risk and therefore managerial risk …

We provide new evidence that equity incentives can have perverse effects on firm value. Conditioning the relationship … between chief executive officer (CEO) incentives and the risk exposure generated by corporate policy decisions on how risk is … avoid risk, the incentive effect of delta partially offsets risk aversion. We show that while CEO incentives affect …

We examine the effect of board members with venture capital experience (i.e., VC directors) on executive incentives at …-taking incentives (i.e., vega) and greater pay-for-performance sensitivity (i.e., delta). These effects are more substantial if VC …-taking incentives of the CEO instilled by such directors. Lastly, we find that having VC directors on nominating and/or governance …

We examine the effect of board members with venture capital experience (i.e., VC directors) on executive incentives at …-taking incentives (i.e., vega) and pay-for-performance sensitivity (i.e., delta). These effects are more substantial if VC directors are … boards of public firms is partly explained by increased risk-taking incentives of the CEO instilled by such directors. Lastly …