We consider the problem of matching a set of medical students to a set of medical residency positions (hospitals) under …

paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …

We investigate the similarities and differences between matching markets and other canonical economic settings in the … presence of complementarity. In particular, we explain the formal connections between the structure of matching markets with … complementary contracts and games with strategic complements, and between matching markets and exchange economies with gross …

We propose a solution to the trade-off between Pareto efficiency and stability in matching markets. We define a … matching to be essentially stable if any claim initiates a chain of reassignments that ultimately results in the initial …

I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching … opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two … allowed to form blocking pairs. Second, dynamic matching markets exhibit a form of externality that is not present in static …

existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept to a matching-based Cournot model in which the unit production cost … technology and human capital are complementary, the positive assortative matching (PAM) is a stable matching under rational … marginal effects of technology and human capital, the PAM is still a rational stable matching. However, if the substitutive …

observed outcomes are stable, and among those a large majority culminate at the receiver-optimal stable matching. Second …

We study manipulability of stable matching mechanisms and show that manipulability comparisons are equivalent to … typically used mechanism that selects the stable matching that is best for one side of the market has no incentive advantage … as experiments show that agents who match in a decentralized way tend to coordinate on the median stable matching, when …

search and initiate contact (i.e., Upwork, Care.com); others implement centralized matching (i.e., Uber, Lyft, Amazon Home …

under-demanded at the student-optimal stable matching, are removed with their assigned seats, then the assignments of the …