We find strong evidence that when the customer base is more concentrated, the supplier firm's CEO receives more risk-taking incentives in compensation. This finding is robust to numerous alternative specifications and to different approaches that mitigate endogeneity concerns. Further, we show...

We construct a model to show that predatory strategies by a financially strong rival can cause a financially weak firm to underinvest. This threat intensifies when the two firms produce similar products and share similar future investment opportunities. We show that cash holdings become more...

We reexamine Stiglitz Weiss (1981) credit rationing by simultaneously considering adverse selection and moral hazard. If returns of the projects are ranked by first-order stochastic dominance, neither adverse selection nor moral hazard exists. If the projects have equalized expected returns,...

Housing prices in Norway and the Norwegian household-debt-to-disposable-income ratio have reached unprecedentedly high levels in recent years, raising debates about whether there is a serious housing bubble. Contributing to the debates, we study home equity-based refinancing in Norway and have...

We examine whether economic links with major customers, an important group of strong stakeholders, act as a deterrent to corporate misconduct. We show that firms with a concentrated customer base are less likely to commit misconduct and face lower penalties. These findings hold with numerous...

We use a variant of the Hotelling (1929) model to illustrate that, when a firm faces hard payment constraint(s), financially strong rivals may adopt predatory strategies to drive the firm out of the product market and hence to obtain extra profit from enhanced market power later on. Predation is...