In this paper, we study the impact of consumer-generated quality information (e.g., consumer reviews) on a firm's dynamic pricing strategy in presence of strategic consumers. Such information is useful, not only to the consumers that have not yet purchased the product, but also to the firm. The...

We develop an analytical framework to investigate the competitiveimplications of personalized pricing (PP), whereby firms chargedifferent prices to different consumers based on their willingness topay. We embed PP in a model of vertical product differentiation and showhow it affects firms’...

In many industries, Internet referral services, hosted either byindependent third-party infomediaries or by manufacturers, serve asdigitally enabled lead generators in electronic markets, directingconsumer traffic to downstream retailers in a distribution network. Thisreshapes the extended...

We study a generalized Hotelling duopoly in which a consumer's net utility from a product depends on the location of product and consumer in product attribute space, a random utility term that captures idiosyncratic preferences, and the price of the product. Our model allows us to vary the...

We provide a model of bookbuilding in IPOs, in which the issuer can choose to ration shares. We consider two allocation rules. Under share dispersion, before informed investors submit their bids, they know that, in the aggregate, winning bidders will receive only a fraction of their demand. We...

We model competition between risk-neutral principals who hire weakly risk-averse agents to produce a good of variable quality. The agent can increase the likelihood of producing a high-quality good by providing costly effort. We demonstrate that, when the agent is strictly risk-averse, the cost...

We provide a model of bookbuilding in IPOs, in which the issuer can choose to ration shares. We consider two allocation rules. Under share dispersion, before informed investors submit their bids, they know that, in the aggregate, winning bidders will receive only a fraction of their demand. We...

In multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard, we provide sufficient conditions for the outcomes of pure-strategy equilibria in direct mechanisms to be preserved when principals can offer indirect communication schemes. The conditions include strong robustness in the direct...