The basic goal of this paper is to develop an endogenous trade policy model in the Grossman and Helpman (1994) tradition that could engenise the number of lobby groups in the economy. It uses a game who has three stages.

I study an evolutionary model of equilibrium selection in supermodular games where players are involved in simultaneous play. This is taken to refer to a context, in contrast with most evolutionary literature, where players' objective is to have their actions match a certain statistic of the...

We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed by recent evolutionary literature to the class of strict supermodular games when two simple behavior rules coexist in the population, imitation and myopic optimization.

This paper deals with a simple, Keynesian growth model. The main issue is whether Nash bargaining about wages may help to avoid cycles. Our result comes somewhat in the negative: Cycles may still persist. Their existence or emergence is related to violent investment behavior near the long-run,...

A long-standing conjecture is that winner-take-all games such as patent races lead to the survival of risk-takers and the extinction of risk-averters. In many species a winner-take-all game determines the males' right to reproduce, and the same argument suggests that males will evolve to be...

In this paper we replicate and extend the experiment of Fehr and Gaechter (2000) that analyzes the effect of an opportunity to punish others on the level contributions in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism.