Online auctions with a fixed end-time often experience a sharp increase in bidding towards the end despite using a proxy-bidding format. We provide a novel explanation of this phenomenon under private values. We study a correlated private values environment in which the seller bids in her own...

In the standard independent private values (IPV)model, each bidder’s beliefs about the values of any other bidder is represented by a unique prior. In this paper we relax this assumption and study the question of auction design in an IPV setting characterized by ambiguity: bidders have an...

We study elicitation of subjective beliefs of an agent facing ambiguity (model uncertainty): the agent has a non-singleton set of (first-order) priors on an event and a second-order distribution on these priors. Such a two-stage decomposition of uncertainty and non-reduction of subjective...

We elicit subjective ambiguous beliefs of an agent with ambiguity-sensitive preferences; in particular, as represented by the alpha-maxmin model. An important problem with the model is that it cannot be identified using observations from typical choice problems, as the preference parameter alpha...