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Using the aggregative game approach as developed by Cornes and Hartley (2003, 2007) this paper analyzes the conditions under which matching mechanisms in a public good economy lead to interior matching equilibria in which all agents make strictly positive flat contributions to the public good....
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Die gegenwärtige im Kyoto-Protokoll festgelegte Klimapolitik versucht vorrangig, dem Klimawandel mit einer Strategie der Emissionsverminderung zu begegnen. Sollte die Klimapolitik in Zukunft weniger auf Emissionsvermeidung und eher auf eine Anpassung an die Erderwärmung zielen? Hubertus Bardt,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008906687
Using the aggregative game approach as developed by Cornes and Hartley (2003, 2007) this paper analyzes the conditions under which matching mechanisms in a public good economy lead to interior matching equilibria in which all agents make strictly positive flat contributions to the public good....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003923234
Matching mechanisms are regarded as an important instrument to bring about Pareto optimal allocations in a public good economy and to cure the underprovision problem associated with private provision of public goods. The desired Pareto optimal interior matching equilibrium, however, emerges only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011305
Recent international climate negotiations suggest that complete agreements are unlikely to materialize. Instead, partial cooperation between like-minded countries appears a more likely outcome. In this paper we analyze the effects of such partial cooperation between like-minded countries. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009570868
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When providing public goods through voluntary contributions, a donor may introduce unilateral matching in order to reduce underprovision of the public good and thus inefficiency. By itself, however, matching benefits the donor but harms the recipient. We apply Cornes and Hartley's aggregative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371914