A set of jobs need to be served by a server which can serve only one job at a time. Jobs have processing times and incur waiting costs (linear in their waiting time). The jobs share their costs through compensation using monetary transfers. In the first part, we provide an axiomatic...

A group of players in a cooperative game are partners (e.g., as in the form of a union or a joint ownership) if the prospects for cooperation are restricted such that cooperation with players outside the partnership requires the accept of all the partners. The formation of such partnerships...

As is known, there is no rule satisfying Adittivity on the complete domain of bankruptcy problems. This paper explores some Partial-Adittivity properties in this context. We determine that Adittivity restricted to bankruptcy problems which in some way keep the conflictivity of the creditors'...

This paper considers a fair division problem with indivisible objects, like jobs, houses, positions, etc., and one divisible good (money). The individuals consume money and one object each. The class of fair allocation rules that are strategy-proof in the strong sense that no coalition of...

A set of agents stand to receive a service. No two agents can be served simultaneously. A Queue has been organized, and agents having to wait should receive monetary compensations. We characterize the rule assigning positions in the queue and compensations corresponding to the payoffs...

Conditions α and β are two well-known rationality conditions in the theory of rational choice. This paper examines the implication of weaker versions of these two rationality conditions in the context of solutions to non-convex bargaining problems. It is shown that, together with the standard...

As it is known, there is no rule satisfying Additivity on the complete domain of bankruptcy problems. This paper proposes a notion of partial Additivity in this context, to be called µ-Additivity. We find that µ-Additivity, together with two quite compelling axioms, Anonymity and Continuity,...

In two-sided matching problems, we consider "natural" changes in prefer- ences of agents in which only the rankings of current partners are enhanced. We introduce two desirable properties of matching rules under such rank- enhancements of partners. One property requires that an agent who be-...

In an abstract model of division problems, we study division rules that are not manipulable through a reallocation of individual characteristic vectors within a coalition (e.g. reallocation of claims in bankruptcy problems). A coalition can be formed if members of the coalition are connected on...

This paper studies the problem of allocating divisible resources among agents based on their characteristics. A simple example is the bankruptcy problem, which allocates the liquidation value of a bankrupted firm to creditors based on their claims. By allowing agents' characteristics to be...