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Optimal Redistribution Through Public Provision of Private Goods

Kang, Zi Yang - 2021

How does a private market influence the optimal design of a public program? In this paper, I study a designer who has preferences over how a public option and a private good are allocated. However, she can design only the public option. Her design affects the distribution of consumers who...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013249503

Ex-post Rank Efficiency for the Random Assignment Problem

Feizi, Mehdi - 2022

We introduce a new notion of ex-post efficiency for random assignment problems, namely ex-post rank efficiency that gives a maximal number of agents their favored objects. An ex-post rank efficient random assignment is a lottery over rank efficient deterministic assignments, in the sense of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013307297

Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items : An Efficient, Envy-Free Algorithm

Brams, Steven J. - 2013

Many procedures have been suggested for the venerable problem of dividing a set of indivisible items between two players. We propose a new algorithm (AL), related to one proposed by Brams and Taylor (BT), which requires only that the players strictly rank items from best to worst. Unlike BT, in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081091

Probabilistic Assignment of Objects : Characterizing the Serial Rule

Bogomolnaia, Anna; Heo, Eun Jeong - 2011

We study the problem of assigning a set of objects to a set of agents, when each agent is supposed to receive only one object and has strict preferences over the objects. In the absence of monetary transfers, we focus on the probabilistic rules, which takes the ordinal preferences as input (the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014183439

Green Eggs and Ham : The CISG, Path Dependence, and the Behavioural Economics of Lawyers’ Choices of Law in International Sales Contracts

Spagnolo, Lisa - 2022

market distortion; rational decision making within game theory frameworks under different jurisdictional background …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014192105

Characterizations of the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism

Hashimoto, Tadashi; Hirata, Daisuke - 2011

This paper provides two axiomatizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism. First, the mechanism is characterized by ordinal efficiency, envy-freeness, and truncation robustness. Truncation robustness restricts changes in assignments when agents truncate their preference lists. In this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195452

Chapter 5 The Economic Theory of Gift-Giving: Perfect Substitutability of Transfers and Redistribution of Wealth

Mercier Ythier, Jean - In: Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and …, (pp. 227-369). 2006

This chapter reviews the theory of the voluntary public and private redistribution of wealth elaborated by economic … analysis in the last forty years or so. The central object of the theory is altruistic gift-giving, construed as benevolent … voluntary redistribution of income or wealth. The theory concentrates on lump-sum voluntary transfers, individual or collective …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023678

Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets

Che, Yeon-Koo; Tercieux, Olivier - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 1, pp. 239-271

We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences are randomly drawn from a class of distributions, allowing for both common and idiosyncratic shocks. We provide a broad set of circumstances under which, as the market grows...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010026

Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition

Kamada, Yuichiro; Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 2, pp. 761-793

, school admissions, and teacher assignment. We develop a general theory of matching mechanisms under distributional …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010043

Obvious Mistakes in a Strategically Simple College Admissions Environment

Shorrer, Ran I.; Sóvágó, Sándor - 2017

2013. Costly mistakes have externalities: they transfer tuition waivers from high- to low-socioeconomic status students …, and increase the number of students attending college. To shed light on the mechanisms underlying mistakes, we exploit a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011819500