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Mechanism design is a subfield of game theory that aims to design games whose equilibria have desired properties such as achieving high efficiency or high revenue. Algorithmic mechanism design is a subfield that lies on the border of mechanism design and computer science and deals with mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025450
selective update of some of the developments and applications of auction theory in the two decades since Wilson (1992) wrote the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025452
condition for total monotonicity. The REE is an efficient SCF so it is attainable by an auction if and only if it satisfies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029999
On many online auction sites it is now possible for a seller to augment his auction with a maximum or buy-out price … on by other sellers. The buy-out price will increase revenue in the current auction, but revenue in future auctions will …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014031176
Sellers benefit on average from revealing information about their goods to buyers, but the incentive to exaggerate undermines the credibility of seller statements. When multiple goods are being auctioned, we show that ordinal cheap talk, which reveals a complete or partial ordering of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014031810
independent values across bidders. The values are assumed to be perfectly persistent over time.We analyze the first-price auction … disclosure regime, in which each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction at the end of each round. In … equilibrium, the winner of the initial auction lowers his bids over time, while losers keep their bids constant, in anticipation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013139373
In many auctions, a good match between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties although information about the quality of the match may be incomplete. This paper examines the case in which the bidder is better informed about the quality of his match with the seller...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013139400
An IPV 2-bidder second-price auction is preceded by two rounds of bribing: prior to the auction each bidder can try to … bribe his rival to depart from the auction, so that he (the briber) will become the sole participant and obtain the good for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125179
We analyze the rationale for hiding information in open auction formats. In particular, we focus on the incentives for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013098020
In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed … auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in a setting …, the Dutch auction produces more revenue than would a first price auction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013109754