Reputation concerns of politicians sometimes force them to implement biased policies. We study the effect of reputation (i.e., reelection) concerns on taxation in the age of globalization. To this end, we construct a two-country asymmetric tax competition model in which the residents in one of...

In majoritarian legislatures, minority parties cannot directly influence policymaking. However, they may serve as whistleblowers against the majority parties' harmful policymaking. This study aims to explore whether a minority party's monitoring mitigates a political agency problem in a...

While it has been argued that money politics magnifies political distrust, little is known about how political distrust affects money politics. To reveal this overlooked aspect, we first construct a static electoral competition model where two candidates propose policy platforms, and an interest...

Why do politicians sometimes support evidently false claims, such as fake news and conspiracy theories, spreading among a minority of the electorate? We analyze this political supply of misinformation from the perspective of politicians’ electoral incentives. For this purpose, we construct a...

This study examines how an endogenous change in political trust affects the performance of a representative democracy. To this end, we construct a two-period political agency model in which voters face uncertainty about the distribution of politicians' types (model uncertainty) as well as each...