In response to corporate governance concerns, SEC disclosure rules, and encouragement by Institutional Shareholder Services, most large U.S. public firms have adopted executive stock ownership requirements in recent years. Compared to CEOs already in compliance, CEOs who have not yet fulfilled...

Causal evidence on the effect of managerial ownership on firm performance is elusive due to a lack of within-firm variation and credible empirical designs. We identify this causal effect by exploiting the 2003 Tax Cut as a natural experiment, which increased net-of-tax effective managerial...

We study how well-incentivized boards monitor CEOs and whether such monitoring improves performance. Using unique, detailed data on boards' information sets and decisions for a large sample of private-equitybacked firms, we find that gathering information helps boards learn about CEO ability....

Grounded in agency theory, this paper investigates the effect of board independence on managerial ownership. We exploit the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the associated exchange listing requirements as an exogenous regulatory shock that raises board independence. Our...

Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure in Manufacture Public Companies at Indonesian Stock Exchange. This research aimed at knowing the influence of audit quality, proportion of independent commissioner, audit committee, firm size, managerial ownership and leverage. It used purposive...

We identify the power of institutional blockholders to influence management using previous occurrences of forced CEO turnover at other firms in the blockholders' overall portfolio. We create a “powerful blockholder linkage” measure that strongly predicts future forced CEO turnover. These...