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The Influence of CEO Power on Compensation Contract Design

Abernethy, Margaret A. - 2015

We investigate if CEO power influences a firm's decision to change its compensation system in response to regulatory and public pressure. In particular, we assess if CEO power influences the choice of performance measures as a form of camouflage to minimize the impact of these reforms on their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013032118

Shareholders Have a Say in Executive Compensation : Evidence from Say-on-Pay in the United States

Kimbro, Marinilka Barros - 2015

This paper examines the SEC regulation requiring non-binding general shareholder vote on executive compensation–“say-on-pay” (SOP). We examine the first two years of SOP in the Russell 3000. The results confirm previous shareholder-proposal studies by finding that SOP approval (reject)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036020

CEO Incentive Contracts, Risk Shifting, and Commitment Benefits of Gender Diverse Boards

Nanda, Vikram K. - 2020

We argue gender-diverse boards are associated with distinct preferences that reassure investors about their commitment to moderate risk and boost long-term corporate survival. Results suggest a strong relation between gender-diverse boards and bondholder-aligned CEO compensation components,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849311

CEO Compensation

Frydman, Carola - 2010

result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013145369

Executive Pay Clawbacks and Their Taxation

Walker, David I. - 2021

Executive pay clawback provisions require executives to repay previously received compensation under certain circumstances, such as a downward adjustment to the financial results upon which their incentive pay was predicated. The use of these provisions is on the rise, and the SEC is expected to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013243006

Striking Oil in the Boardroom : Overpaying Executives through Manipulating Performance Metrics

Atanasov, Vladimir A. - 2020

suggest that managers can routinely manipulate performance metrics in order to increase their performance-based compensation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012832494

The Dark Side of Investor Conferences : Evidence of Managerial Opportunism

Bushee, Brian J.; Taylor, Daniel J.; Zhu, Christina - 2021

facilitate managerial opportunism is scarce. In this paper, we examine whether managers opportunistically exploit heightened … attention around the conference to “hype” the stock. We find that managers increase the quantity of voluntary disclosure leading … with some managers hyping the stock prior to the conference …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013312918

Clawback provisions and firm risk

Babenko, Ilona; Bennett, Benjamin; Bizjak, John M.; … - 2019

Panel OLS and GMM-IV estimates indicate that executives respond to the adoption of a compensation clawback provision by decreasing firm risk. The mechanisms that transmit incentives to decisions and decisions to risk appear to be more conservative investment and financial policies and preemptive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012107693

CEO pay at valeant : does extreme compensation create extreme risk?

Larcker, David F.; Tayan, Brian - 2016

The litmus test for an effective compensation program is whether it provides “pay for performance.” While the concept of pay for performance is simple, its implementation is not. In particular, boards must consider not only whether a compensation plan encourages executives to pursue...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864729

What Does CEOs' Pay-for-Performance Reveal About Shareholders' Attitude Toward Earnings Overstatements?

Guthrie, Katherine; Kwon, Illoong; Sokolowsky, Jan - 2015

If overstatements were a symptom of the agency conflict, pay-for-performance sensitivities should have increased in response to the additional penalties for misreporting imposed by SOX. Our finding of their decrease is inconsistent with the view that overstatements were an unintended consequence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204131