Under the Affordable Care Act, individual states have discretion in how they define coverage regions, within which insurers must charge the same premium to buyers of the same age, family structure, and smoking status. We exploit variation in these definitions to investigate whether the size of...

There is extensive theoretical research focusing on the ways in which principal–agent interactions vary depending on the agent’s expertise or knowledge. While the empirical research testing the implications of these models involves a broad array of experts ranging from lawyers to physicians...

In government-sponsored health insurance, subsidy design affects market outcomes. First, holding premiums fixed, subsidies determine insurance uptake and average cost. Insurers then respond to these changes, adjusting premiums. Combining data from the first four years of the California ACA...

We show that, in a large class of models, market frictions lead to predictable dynamic patterns of the acquisition and subsequent shedding of inputs by firms. The logic is as follows. During high demand and expansionary periods, firms that fail to have inputs (machinery, labor, space, credit) in...

We estimate the demand for health insurance in the California Affordable Care Act marketplace (Covered California) without using parametric assumptions about the unobserved components of utility. To do this, we develop a computational method for constructing sharp identified sets in a...