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Any firm choosing a CEO faces a double problem: candidate selection and choice of a compensation scheme. We derive sufficient conditions where the unique optimal compensation scheme is a capped-bonus contract in a pure moral-hazard environment, while equity is used when the firm also faces...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013094697
Using a regulation that increased portfolio disclosure frequency of US mutual funds as an exogenous shock shortening … corroborate these findings to reveal more pronounced effects when fund managers have stronger career incentives and are less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013236397
We analyze the optimal contract between a risk-averse manager and the initial shareholders in a two-period model where the manager's investment effort, carried out in period 1, and her current effort, carried out in period 2, both impact the second-period profit, so that it may be difficult to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538964
This paper analyzes which stock option scheme best aligns the interests of a firm's manager and shareholders when both are risk-averse. We consider granting to the manager a basic fixed salary and one of the following four options: European, Parisian, Asian and American options. Choosing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013091782
. Employing the certainty equivalence principle, I built on insights from Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) to derive a continuous … finding of standard models based on the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) framework that options value to a risk …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013115361
Mutual fund managers' compensation packages often contain relative performance-dependent components such as year …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014238831
We present an algorithm that merges a certainty-equivalence framework with the least-squares Monte Carlo algorithm to obtain the executive stock option (ESO) value for a risk-averse and undiversified agent. We account for the difference between executive's value and firm cost of the ESO. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012953215
This paper adds to the empirical evidence on the extent to which stock-based pay incentivizes and rewards European corporate executives. It shows that the actual realized gains (that is, take-home compensation) from stock-based pay of CEOs in European publicly-listed firms may be underestimated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012913221
Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Holding the cost of the option grant to the firm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013110514
More than half of S&P 500 CEOs receive options annually, however extant valuation models have not accounted for portfolio considerations. We show the inability of executives to diversify means portfolio effects matter: exercise thresholds and shareholder costs are lower than for stand-alone...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905705