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This Article is the first academic study to systematically analyze the overall sensitivity of executive compensation to stock buybacks. Specifically, my analysis of executive compensation arrangements of CEOs included in the S&P 500 Index reveals that buybacks can enhance a record high portion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012841055
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. Recent research has shown that executive hedging has become more prevalent. In essence, managers are unwinding the acute …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012956850
Equity-based compensation causes increases in firms' share count and dilutes Earnings Per Share (EPS), which provides firms with an incentive to raise EPS using either share buybacks or earnings management. We employ a regression discontinuity framework to provide evidence of a causal link...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853424
Theory is conflicted on the impact of equity-based compensation on managerial risk taking. We explore this issue by studying the relation between equity-based compensation and firms' propensity to make acquisitions. Consistent with the notion that equity-based compensation encourages managerial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012856634
expectations - that buybacks impose option-induced agency costs on outside shareholders, and that managers benefit from weak …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013141482
The relationship between CEO pay and performance has been much analyzed in the management and economics literature. This study analyzes the structure of executive compensation in family and non-family firms. In line with predictions of agency theory, it is found that the share of base salary is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003727332
Incentive effects of performance-based compensation schemes for management may be weakened or biased by macroeconomic influences on remuneration. These influences can be seen as reflecting luck from the CEO’s perspective. In this chapter we present a model for how to avoid compensating CEO for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003976019
This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378949
Standard principal-agent theory predicts that large firms should not use employee stock options and other stock-based compensation to provide incentives to non-executive employees. Yet, business practitioners appear to believe that stock-based compensation improves incentives, and mounting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010362951