We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender's utility depends only on the expected state. We show that upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and reveals the states below the cutoff is optimal for all prior distributions of the state if and only if the sender's...

In this paper, we show that consumers delay their buying to learn the unknown quality of a product. Agents receive imperfect but informative signals about the unknown quality. Then, each one simultaneously decides whether or not to buy the product in one of the two periods. Consumers with...

Does social identity affect how decision makers consume and digest new information? We study this question through a theoretically informed experiment, employing a variant of the sender receiver game in which receivers can purchase reports from up to two senders. Depending on senders'...

We introduce a "nestedness" relation for a general class of sender-receiver games and compare equilibrium properties, in particular the amount of information transmitted, across games that are nested. Roughly, game B is nested in game A if the players’s optimal actions are closer in game B. We...

This paper performs a welfare analysis of markets with private information in which agents can condition on noisy prices in the rational expectations tradition. Price-contingent strategies introduce two externalities in the use of private information: a payoff (pecuniary) externality related to...

Asymmetric information is an important source of inefficiency when an asset (such as a firm) is transacted. The two main sources of this asymmetry are the unobserved idiosyncratic characteristics of the asset (such as future profitability) and unobserved idiosyncratic choices (like secret price...

This paper experimentally investigates social learning in a two-agent prediction game with both exogenous and endogenous ordering of decisions and a continuous action space. Given that individuals regularly fail to apply rational timing, we refrain from implementing optimal timing of decisions...

We study flexible public information design in global games. In addition to receiving public information from the designer, agents are endowed with exogenous private information and must decide between two actions (invest and not invest), the profitability of which depends on unknown...

We study flexible public information design in global games. In addition to receiving public information from the designer, agents are endowed with exogenous private information and must decide whether or not to “attack” a status-quo. The designer does not trust the agents to play favourably...