2100. Once the free-riding incentives of non-participants are taken into account, only a “grand coalition” including … virtually all regions can be successful. This grand coalition is profitable as a whole, implying that all countries can gain … from participation provided appropriate transfers are made across them. However, neither the grand coalition nor smaller …

policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition formation game, in which countries first decide on whether to join an … and emissions. We find that strategic delegation crowds out all efforts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious …

2100. Once the free-riding incentives of non-participants are taken into account, only a “grand coalition” including … virtually all regions can be successful. This grand coalition is profitable as a whole, implying that all countries can gain … from participation provided appropriate transfers are made across them. However, neither the grand coalition nor smaller …

policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition formation game, in which countries first decide on whether to join an … and emissions. We find that strategic delegation crowds out all efforts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious …

2100. Once the free-riding incentives of non-participants are taken into account, only a "grand coalition" including … virtually all regions can be successful. This grand coalition is profitable as a whole, implying that all countries can gain … from participation provided appropriate transfers are made across them. However, neither the grand coalition nor smaller …

2100. Once the free-riding incentives of non-participants are taken into account, only a “grand coalition” including … virtually all regions can be successful. This grand coalition is profitable as a whole, implying that all countries can gain … from participation provided appropriate transfers are made across them. However, neither the grand coalition nor smaller …

&S preferences. Stability of the grand coalition is never reached, but potential internally stable grand coalitions are achieved … eines globalen öffentlichen Gutes – z.B. Klimaschutz - eingeführt. Spieler tragen – wenn sie einer Koalition beitreten …

policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition formation game, in which countries first decide on whether to join an … and emissions. We find that strategic delegation crowds out all efforts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious …

countries is self-enforcing. It is shown that there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset of the … parameter space the grand coalition may be stable as well, even if the total number of countries is large. The small stable … coalition is not very effective in mitigating the inefficiency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The ineffectiveness is …