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replicate their analysis using matched register data for Finland. We find a large spike also in the job finding rate at the time …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955274
replicate their analysis using matched register data for Finland. We find a large spike also in the job finding rate at the time …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011664468
Extended unemployment benefits programs are triggered by the state insured unemployment rate while intrastate demand conditions often vary dramatically. Some tight local labor markets may therefore exhibit a large effect of extended unemployment benefits. Using a competing risk duration model,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014207763
Ein Instrument zur Eindämmung von Moral Hazard in der Arbeitslosenversicherung ist die finanzielle Sanktion in Form …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011418245
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449662
The potential duration of benefits is generally viewed as an important determinant of unemployment duration. This paper evaluates a unique policy change that prolonged entitlement to regular unemployment benefits from 30 weeks to a maximum of 209 weeks for elderly individuals in certain regions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011411285
A large fraction of the eligible unemployed workers does not claim for unemployment insurance (UI) and, among claimants, many do not register immediately upon layoff. This paper argues that, to understand this intriguing phenomenon, one needs to model jointly job search and take-up efforts and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012418485
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011414725
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011635521
Predictions of whether newly unemployed individuals will become long-term unemployed are important for the planning and policy mix of unemployment insurance agencies. We analyze unique data on three sources of information on the probability of re-employment within 6 months (RE6), for the same...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014338662