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Recent work has shown that, in the presence of moral hazard, balanced budget Nash equilibria in groups are not pareto-optimal. This work shows that when agents misperceive the effects of their actions on the joint outcome, there exist a set of sharing rules which balance the budget and lead to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012476839
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effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important … consequences for the provision of incentives in organizations and the design of sports competitions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012845683
severance policy facilitates the adoption of team incentives and team-based production by making it cost-effective to implement …This paper examines the optimal compensation scheme, job design, and severance policy for a team using a model of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012967589
verbal communication. This article reports an experiment, in which we compare the degree of routinization and the performance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014173986
In this paper, we analyze group incentives when a proportion of agents feel in- equity aversion as defined by Fehr and … show that a tournament provides strong incentives to agents who only care about their own payoff but that it is not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014050416
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This dissertation analyzes the incentives of workers in organizations that utilize teams. In Chapter 1, I study a moral … performance evaluation — each agent's pay is increasing in the performance of the other — and is nonlinear in team output. In …-Rodriguez, Peng Shao, and I study the efficiency of decentralized team formation inside research organizations through the lens of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013475565
We study an infinitely-repeated game of team production, where agents must supply costly effort under moral hazard. The … principal also has the option to delegate an additional production-relevant decision to a team member. We provide conditions … under which delegation changes the scope of peer sanction and thus influences the implicit incentives generated by the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013309991