This paper studies a class of continuous-time stochastic games in which the actions of a long-run player have a persistent effect on payoffs. For example, the quality of a firm's product depends on past as well as current effort, or the level of a policy instrument depends on a government's past...

We model the dynamics of discrimination and show how its evolution can identify the underlying source. We test these theoretical predictions in a field experiment on a large online platform where users post content that is evaluated by other users on the platform. We assign posts to accounts...

I study how the persistence of past choices can be used to create incentives in a continuous time stochastic game in which a large player, such as a firm, interacts with a sequence of short-run players, such as customers. The long-run player faces moral hazard and her past actions are...

Discrimination---differential treatment by group identity---is widely studied in economics. Its source is often categorized as taste-based or statistical (belief-based)---a valuable distinction for policy design and welfare analysis. We argue that in many situations, individuals may have...

Discrimination—differential treatment by group identity—is widely studied in economics. Its source is often categorized as taste-based or statistical (belief-based)—a valuable distinction for policy design and welfare analysis. We argue that in many situations, individuals may have...

We formalize the optimal design of experiments when there is interference between units, i.e. an individual's outcome depends on the outcomes of others in her group. We focus on randomized saturation designs, two-stage experiments that first randomize treatment saturation of a group, then...

A firm employs workers to obtain costly unverifiable information for example, categorizing the content of images. Workers are monitored by comparing their messages. The optimal contract under limited liability exhibits three key features: (i) the monitoring technology depends crucially on the...

This paper studies how persistence can be used to create incentives in a continuous-time stochastic game in which a long-run player interacts with a sequence of short-run players. Observation of the long-run player's actions are distorted by a Brownian motion and the actions of both players...