Do firms under relative payoffs maximizing (RPM) behavior always choose a strategy profile that results in tougher competition compared to firms under absolute payoffs maximizing (APM) behavior? In this paper we will address this issue through a simple model of symmetric oligopoly where firms...

The seminal work of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) on how preemption erodes the value of an option to wait raises general questions about the relation between models in discrete and continuous time and thus about the interpretation of its central result, relying on an "infinitely fine grid". Here...

We construct a framework for modeling dynamic Cournot oligopoly. We consider models where utility maximizing consumers give rise to demand functions that depend on current and prior period prices. Future demand depends on the current price and consumers and firms must take this into account when...

Do firms under relative payoff s maximizing (RPM) behavior always choose a strategy profile that results in tougher competition compared to firms under absolute payoffs maximizing (APM) behavior? In this paper we will address this issue through a simple model of symmetric oligopoly where firms...

It is well known that the presence of imperfect monitoring limits the possibility of making efficient agreements. When firms interact repeatedly in multiple markets, however, we show that noisy observations may improve the possibility of collusion. When observation is noisy in at least one...

The article proposes an evolutionary game theoretical analysis of quality and price competition in oligopoly. Using the notion of a finite population evolutionarily stable strategy (FPESS) defined by Schaffer (1989), the relative payoff maximizing behavior is compared with the absolute payoff...

We study a duopoly where the two price setting firms have symmetric information. The firms produce substitute goods with a state dependent common value. The information that is available to both firms about the unknown state of nature is also available to the consumers, who also have access to...

We introduce a model of oligopoly dynamic pricing where firms with limited capacity face a sales deadline. We establish conditions under which the equilibrium is unique and converges to a system of differential equations. Using unique and comprehensive pricing and bookings data for competing...

This paper analyzes competition in a two-period differentiated-products duopoly in the presence of both switching costs and network effects. We show that they have opposite implications on the demand side, specially in the first period. While the former reduces demand elasticities, the latter...