We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate...

Starting from December 2012, insurers in the European Union were prohibited from charging gender-discriminatory prices. We examine the effect of this unisex mandate on risk segmentation in the German health insurance market. While gender used to be a pricing factor in Germany's private health...

Starting from December 2012, insurers in the European Union were prohibited from charging gender-discriminatory prices. We examine the effect of this unisex mandate on risk segmentation in the German health insurance market. While gender used to be a pricing factor in Germany's private health...

How does catastrophe-risk awareness affect selection patterns in catastrophe insurance markets? Catastrophe insurance is often provided by government entities and frequently involves substantial cross-subsidization between people facing very different levels of risk, which could generate adverse...

In the healthcare sector, Selection (S), Moral Hazard (MH) and Supply Induced Demand (SID) are three very important phenomena affecting patients' behavior. Despite there exists a vast theoretical and empirical literature on these phenomena, so far, no contribution has been able to approach them...

Policies to correct market power and selection can be misguided when these forces co-exist. We build a model of symmetric imperfect competition in selection markets that parameterizes the degree of market power and selection. We use graphical price-theoretic reasoning to characterize the...

Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen (2010) find small welfare costs of adverse selection into a premium and out of a baseline health insurance plan offered by an employer. In their model, only the premium plan is required to break even and we argue this drives their conclusion: if the baseline plan...

This paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should cover treatments with the biggest adverse selection problems. Treatments not covered by basic insurance can be covered on...

Starting from December 2012, insurers in the European Union were prohibited from charging gender-discriminatory prices. We examine the effect of this unisex mandate on risk segmentation in the German health insurance market. While gender used to be a pricing factor in Germany's private health...

Starting from December 2012, insurers in the European Union were prohibited from charging gender-discriminatory prices. We examine the effect of this unisex mandate on risk segmentation in the German health insurance market. While gender used to be a pricing factor in Germany's private health...