Starting from December 2012, insurers in the European Union were prohibited from charging gender-discriminatory prices. We examine the effect of this unisex mandate on risk segmentation in the German health insurance market. While gender used to be a pricing factor in Germany's private health...

We present robust evidence on the presence of adverse selection in hospitalization insurance for low-income households. A large randomized control trial from Pakistan allows us to separate adverse selection from moral hazard, to estimate how selection changes at different points of the demand...

Evidence of adverse selection in insurance markets is well-documented in the literature. Recent healthcare reform in the United States imposed substantial changes to health insurer operations, including rating restrictions. We provide evidence of the presence of adverse selection following the...

I study two important aspects of the Australian private ancillaries health insurance (PAHI) market. First, I estimate the effect of PAHI on utilisation of various health services using instrumental variable methods to identify causal effects. Next I test for the presence and direction of...

The aim of this article is to estimate the type of selection that exists in the voluntary health insurance market in Colombia where the compulsory coverage is implemented through a managed care competition. We build a panel database that combines individuals' information from the Ministry of...

Theoretical models predict asymmetric information in health insurance markets may generate inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection and moral hazard. However, previous empirical research has found it difficult to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard in health care. We empirically...

With increasing interest from commercial players in developing insurance markets to meet the needs of low-income people, efforts to find sustainable products have expanded rapidly yet remain elusive. This is particularly true in the domain of health insurance, where the general challenges of...

Existing research on selection in insurance markets focuses on how adverse selection distorts prices and misallocates products across people. This ignores the distributional consequences of who pays the higher prices. In this paper, we show that the distributional incidence depends on the...

We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate...