This study assessed the asymmetry in the causal and dispositional attributions for a company’s failures and successes from the perspective of an external observer in the context of morality- vs. competence-related events. Eight hundred respondents participated in a five-factor experiment...

We study the importance of information technology (IT) in banking for entrepreneurship. Guided by a parsimonious model, we establish that job creation by young firms is stronger in US counties more exposed to banks with greater IT adoption. We present evidence consistent with banks’ IT...

This research explores the feasibility of utilising ChatGPT to categorise patient conditions as urgent and non-urgent. The primary objective is to assess the ChatGPT model's capacity to aid in the automation and digitalisation of healthcare processes, thereby alleviating the workload on...

This paper develops a mechanism design approach to study externalities and re-distribution. The mechanism screens individuals’ social weights to strike a balance among broad distributional objectives, incentives to work, and incentives to reduce externalities. The welfare-optimal allocation...

This paper explores whether professional macroeconomic forecasters manipulate their forecasts to influence voting outcomes. We model a referendum in which a voter chooses between two policies. The voter relies on a forecaster to learn about the macroeconomic consequences of the policies. The...

We study theoretically and experimentally a two-person partnership game whereby agents only see the uncertain outcome of their joint effort but not how much the other agent contributed to it. The model combines problems of free-riding present in public good production and in teams with imperfect...

This paper investigates the optimal information design for a system to minimize congestion cost in the presence of both autonomous vehicles (AVs) and human-driven vehicles (HVs). We incorporate asymmetric information between AVs and HVs in a routing game where there are two routes available and...

A campaign model in which candidates can make law announcements for reforms in the next term will be considered. Acquiring information about these laws incurs the candidates a certain cost. The conditions under which a candidate acquires information about a given law during the campaign will be...

When reelection is uncertain, the election mechanism may provide insufficient incentives to politicians to implement the socially desirable policy. In this paper, we show that incentive contracts which the candidates offer themselves during the campaign can help to alleviate the problem even if...

We consider a model with a politician facing a multi-task problem while in office. The reelection mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favor of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others. We show that a hierarchy of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate...