This paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents have private information that is persistent. In particular, I focus on a continuous time version of a benchmark insurance problem where a risk averse agent would like to borrow from a risk neutral lender to...

The evidence on international capital immobility is extensive, ranging from the correlations between domestic savings and investment pointed out by Feldstein-Horioka (1980), to real interest differentials across countries, to the lack of international portfolio diversification. To what degree...

Under symmetric information, a job protection law that says that a principal who has hired an agent today must also employ them tomorrow can only reduce the two parties’ total surplus. The law restricts the principal’s possibilities to maximize their profit, which equals the total surplus,...

This paper analyses corporate risk choice when firms and their managers have private information regarding firm quality. Managers – representing themselves or shareholders – have a short time horizon and wish to boost the firm’s reputation in the market. Investors observe the firm’s...

People with a self-control problem often seek relief through social interactions rather than binding commitments. Thus, in self-help groups like Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous etc, members are said to achieve better personal outcomes by mainly sharing their experiences. In other...

In an observational learning environment, rational agents with incomplete information may mimic the actions of their predecessors even when their own signal suggests the opposite. This herding behaviour may lead the society to an inefficient outcome if the signals of the early movers happen to...

This Paper studies optimal nominal demand policy in a flexible price economy with monopolistic competition and inattentive firms (Shannon). Inattentiveness gives rise to idiosyncratic information errors and imperfect common knowledge about the shocks hitting the economy. Strategic...

In a model of career concerns for experts, when is a principal hurt from observing more information about their agent? This Paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent's action and information directly on the agent's action. When the latter kind of...

Firms signal high quality through high prices even if the market structure is highly competitive and price competition is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality, production cost is increasing in quality and the quality of each firm's product is...

This paper analyzes the evolution of conventions in a society with local interaction and mobile players. Three innovative aspects are introduced: Imperfect observability of play outside a player's home location, friction in the strategy adjustment process, and restriced mobility. It is shown...