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Optimal Contracts for Discouraging Deforestation with Risk Averse Agents

Mason, Charles F. - 2018

There is an emerging consensus that carbon emissions must be limited. An attractive approach to promoting carbon reductions is to encourage reductions in deforestation. But any such strategy must confront a basic problem: agents that might be induced to reduce their actions which would reduce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012914953

Optimal truncation in matching markets

Coles, Peter A.; Shorrer, Ran - 2013

Since no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is often room in matching markets for strategic misrepresentation (Roth [25]). In this paper we study a natural form of strategic misrepresentation: reporting a truncation of one's true...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009756282

Non-standard Choice in Matching Markets

Caspari, Gian; Khanna, Manshu - 2022

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodatenon-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditionson participants’ choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatiblemechanisms. Our results imply that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014241474

Optimal Truncation in Matching Markets

Coles, Peter A. - 2013

Since no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is often room in matching markets for strategic misrepresentation (Roth). In this paper we study a natural form of strategic misrepresentation: reporting a truncation of one's true...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081039

Pricing and investments in matching markets

Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 8 (2013) 2, pp. 535-590

Different markets are cleared by different types of prices—seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in some markets, and personalized prices tailored to the buyer in others. We examine a setting in which buyers and sellers make investments before matching in a competitive market....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686665

Existence of steady-state equilibria in matching models with search frictions

Lauermann, Stephan; Nöldeke, Georg - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010499806

Weight-Ranked Divide-and-Conquer Contracts

Chan, Lester T. - 2021

This paper studies a large class of multi-agent contracting models with the property that agents' payoffs constitute a weighted potential game. Multiple equilibria arise due to agents' strategic interactions. I fully characterize a contracting scheme that is optimal to the principal for a large...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013241584

Substitutes and Stability for Many-to-Many Matching With Contracts

Bando, Keisuke; Hirai, Toshiyuki; Zhang, Jun - 2019

Several weakened substitutability conditions have been proved to be sufficient for stability in many-to-one matching with contracts and to be vital for understanding real-life applications. We examine the roles of these weakened conditions in many-to-many matching with contracts, in particular,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014114524

Delegation with incomplete and renegotiable contracts

Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2008 - This version: April 2008

It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment device and hence provide a strategic advantage. Previous literature has shown that any Nash equilibrium outcome of an extensive-form principals-only game can be supported as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012001777

Reference points, social norms, and fairness in contract renegotiations : conference paper

Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2013

-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant … threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent bargaining situations … in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask for markups that are 45 percent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342843