Similar Search Results

Advertising, Pricing & Market Structure in Competitive Matching Markets

Bataille, Edner; Julien, Benoit - 2005

This paper develops a model of pricing and advertising in a matching environment with capacity constrained sellers. Sellers' expenditure on directly informative advertising attracts consumers only probabilistically. Consumers who happen to observe advertisements randomize over the advertised...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027442

Efficient partnership formation in networks

Bloch, Francis; Dutta, Bhaskar; Manea, Mihai - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 3, pp. 779-811

We analyze the formation of partnerships in social networks. Players need favors at random times and ask their neighbors in the network to form exclusive long-term partnerships that guarantee reciprocal favor exchange. Refusing to provide a favor results in the automatic removal of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012104571

Matching with Complementary Contracts

Rostek, Marzena J. - 2020

In this paper, we show that stable outcomes exist in matching environments with complementarities, such as social media platforms or markets for patent licenses. Our results apply to both nontransferable and transferable utility settings, and allow for multilateral agreements and those with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012851566

Bundling incentives in (many-to-many) matching with contracts

Ma, Jonathan; Kominers, Scott Duke - 2018

In many-to-many matching with contracts, the way in which contracts are specified can affect the set of stable equilibrium outcomes. Consequently, agents may be incentivized to modify the set of contracts upfront. We consider one simple way in which agents may do so: unilateral bundling, in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012013224

Price Setting and Competition with Search Frictions

Kudoh, Noritaka - 2008

This paper investigates price determination in a decentralized economy in which buyers' valuations are stochastic and unobservable. In such a market, each buyer's reservation utility depends both on the prevailing price and on the price he actually encounters. The buyer's willingness to trade is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012723914

Reference points, social norms, and fairness in contract renegotiations : conference paper

Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2013

-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant … threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent bargaining situations … in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask for markups that are 45 percent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342843

Reference Points, Social Norms, and Fairness in Contract Renegotiations

Bartling, Björn - 2014

How does an ex ante contract affect behavior in an ex post renegotiation game? We address this question in a canonical … buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a … bargaining threat points. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013065729

How Long-Term Contracts can Mitigate Inefficient Renegotiation Arising Due to Loss Aversion

Göller, Daniel - 2021

A loss-averse buyer and seller face an uncertain environment. Should they write a long-term contract or wait until the … the long-term contract constitutes the reference point to which the parties compare gains and losses induced by the … renegotiated transaction. Whereas Herweg and Schmidt consider that the long-term contract is always performed, it should not in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013222607

Renegotiation of long‐term contracts as part of an implicit agreement

Kostadinov, Rumen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1471-1512

contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for incentive provision, despite the stationarity of the environment. Continuation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806553

Observable Strategies, Commitments, and Contracts

Warneryd, Karl - 2021

We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent’s rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315559