This paper examines the effects of promotion-based tournament incentives for non-CEO executives on corporate innovation …. We find that firms with greater tournament incentives, which are measured as the pay gap between the CEO and other … tournament incentives. The attraction of talent and the reduction in excessive board interventions appear two plausible …

In theory, health care providers may adapt their professional behavior to the financial incentives driven by their … incentives. We propose a theoretical model to identify potential determinants of such preferences. We empirically test our …' hypothetical incentives in France. The empirical results confirm the theoretical ones by establishing that users tend to prefer to …

We provide new evidence that equity incentives can have perverse effects on firm value. Conditioning the relationship … between chief executive officer (CEO) incentives and the risk exposure generated by corporate policy decisions on how risk is … avoid risk, the incentive effect of delta partially offsets risk aversion. We show that while CEO incentives affect …

We examine the effect of board members with venture capital experience (i.e., VC directors) on executive incentives at …-taking incentives (i.e., vega) and greater pay-for-performance sensitivity (i.e., delta). These effects are more substantial if VC …-taking incentives of the CEO instilled by such directors. Lastly, we find that having VC directors on nominating and/or governance …

, and we show that the power of incentives for agents with high wealth is greater than the one for agents with low wealth …. The reason is that richer agents are less risk averse; providing high incentives for less riskaverse agents is beneficial …, the power of incentives for rich agents is identical, but the power of incentives for poor agents declines …

We examine the effect of board members with venture capital experience (i.e., VC directors) on executive incentives at …-taking incentives (i.e., vega) and pay-for-performance sensitivity (i.e., delta). These effects are more substantial if VC directors are … boards of public firms is partly explained by increased risk-taking incentives of the CEO instilled by such directors. Lastly …