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Gürtler, Oliver; Struth, Lennart; Thon, Max - 2022

In many situations, agents take risks by choosing an action that increases their performance immediately, but that potentially leads to a large loss. The current paper studies how such risk-taking behavior depends on the level of competition that the agents face. We study a tournament model and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013337710

The adverse consequences of tournaments : evidence from a field experiment

De Paola, Maria; Gioia, Francesca; Scoppa, Vincenzo - 2016

We run a field experiment to investigate whether competing in rank-order tournaments with different prize spreads affects individual performance. Our experiment involved students from an Italian University who took an intermediate exam in which one part was awarded on the basis of their relative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011455813

Incentive magnitude effects in experimental games : bigger is not necessarily better

Pulford, Briony D.; Colman, Andrew M.; Loomes, Graham - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/4, pp. 1-10

In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their …-form games under task-related incentives of conventional magnitude and compared them with choices and reasons in the same games … under incentives five times as large. Both strategy choices and self-reported reasons for choices were almost …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011848336

Stress and incentives at work

Cottini, Elena; Ghinetti, Paolo; Iossa, Elisabetta; … - 2021

An extensive medical and occupational-health literature finds that an imbalance between effort and reward is an important stressor which produces serious health consequences. We incorporate these effects in a simple agency model with moral hazard and limitecl liability, and study their impact on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012426050

Psychological incentives, financial incentives, and risk attitudes in tournaments : an artefactual field experiment

Cadsby, Bram; Engle-Warnick, Jim; Fang, Tony; Song, Fei - 2015

comparison group in China, we examine how both psychological and financial incentives, together with attitudes toward risk, may … rank-based financial incentives. Our results show that performance-ranking information had a significant motivational … effect on average performance for students, but not for that of workers. Adding financial incentives based on rank provided …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011407820

Revenue drift, incentives, and effort allocation in social enterprises

Vladasel, Theodor; Parker, Simon C.; Sloof, Randolph; … - 2022

enterprise performance and survival. We argue that financial incentives can address this problem by redirecting employee … varying incentive levels, monetary rewards succeed in directing worker effort to commercial tasks; high-powered incentives … attract less prosocial employees, but low-powered incentives do not alter workforce composition. Social enterprises combining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013454823

Employee absence : an organizational perspective

Eskildsen, Jacob Kjær; Frederiksen, Anders; Løkke, … - 2018

workers are inefficient. An additional intriguing finding is that incentives (through promotions and dismissals) are linked to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011925427

Tournaments versus piece rates under limited liability

Kräkel, Matthias - 2004

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004: The existing literature on the comparison of tournaments and piece rates as alternative incentive schemes has focused on the case of unlimited liability. However, in practice real workers' wealth is typically restricted....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343971

The interaction between explicit and relational incentives : an experiment

Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - 2009

We consider repeated trust game experiments to study the interplay between explicit and relational incentives. After … these two variants to play. Theory predicts that subjects will choose the payoff dominated game (representing a bad explicit … contract), because this game better sustains (implicit) relational incentives backed by either reputational or reciprocity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378080

Tournament incentives in the field : gender differences in the workplace

Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A. J.; Sol, Joeri; … - 2012

We ran a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain consisting of 128 stores. In a random sample of these stores, we introduced short-term sales competitions among subsets of stores. We find that sales competitions have a large effect on sales growth, but only in stores where the store's manager...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378827