coordination costs. The last hypothesis stems from the increasing involvement of non-bank institutions and, in particular, the rise … borrowers likely involve fewer monitoring tools and weaker control rights. We evaluate these explanations of cov-lite contract … the propensity toward other contractual features that influence when and how creditors have control. However, these …

coordination costs. The last hypothesis stems from the increasing involvement of non-bank institutions and, in particular, the rise … borrowers likely involve fewer monitoring tools and weaker control rights. We evaluate these explanations of cov-lite contract … the propensity toward other contractual features that influence when and how creditors have control. However, these …

coordination when there is strategic uncertainty. We compare the choices made by experimental subjects in a minimum effort game. In … control sessions, incentives are formulated as a classic gain contract, while in treatment sessions, incentives are framed as … an isomorphic loss contract. Our results show that loss contracts reduce the minimum efforts of groups and worsen …

In case of multiple creditors a coordination problem can arise when the borrowingfirm runs into financial distress …. Even if the project's value at maturity is enoughto pay all creditors in full, some creditors may be tempted to foreclose … on theirloans. We develop a model of creditor coordination where a large creditor movesbefore a continuum of small …

coordination of creditors of another country. We find, however, that the contagious e.ects on the price of debt precipitated … simultaneous investment decision into two assets, which are subject to correlated fundamental states, as a coordination problem …

creditors the option to delay their foreclosure decision rather than obliging them to simultaneous actions as suggested by … diminishes creditor coordination failure whenever the firm is expected to be in distress. -- global games ; creditor coordination …