. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong … incentives to game the system, which caused dramatic consequences for non-strategic students. However, almost none of the new … manipulate. Simultaneously, the admission to each school became strategy-proof to a larger set of students, making the schools …

particular, the set of dynamically stable matchings forms a lattice with respect to students' preferences but not with respect to …

We introduce a college admission with tuition transfers problem. In this novel formulation, students' payments are not … burden on students. We introduce two mechanism classes - the first is efficient, and the second is stable and constrained …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams …. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare the equilibria of “centralized college … admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to …

students prefer DCA whereas higher ability students prefer CCA. The main qualitative predictions of the theory are supported by …We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking … students' efforts in entrance exams. Students hold private information regarding their ability level that affects the cost of …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams …. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of "centralized college admissions …" (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and "decentralized college admissions" (DCA) where students only apply to one …

I study a college-admissions model with two need-blind colleges and heterogeneous students. In a game in which colleges … worse off but make all students and the other college better off …

I propose a centralized clearinghouse for college admissions in which students can signal enthusiasm by commitment, as … in early-decision programs. Furthermore, students can specify financial aid in their preferences and they can be matched …. To study centralized college admissions, I advance the theory of stability for many-to-many matching markets with …

mechanisms that are more fair by counting: the old mechanism always has at least as many blocking students as the new mechanism …