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Ho, Ken - 2019

We study airport slot allocation problems during weather-induced congestion. These real-life matching problems are important to airlines as the costs of delays are significant compared to their profits. We introduce a new mechanism, Multiple Trading Cycles (MTC), to allocate landing slots. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901046

Cyclical Conflicts and Singleton Cores in Two-Sided Matching Markets

Evci, Bora - 2019

In this paper, we propose a new cycle criterion, Cyclical Conflicts (CCs), for preference profiles in two-sided matching markets through a dynamic mechanism. We first show that CCs provide a complete characterization of singleton cores in two-sided matching markets. Secondly, we prove the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012891501

The Efficiency of A Dynamic Decentralized Two-Sided Matching Market

Liu, Tracy - 2019

This paper empirically studies a decentralized dynamic peer-to-peer matching market. We use data from a leading ride-sharing platform in China to estimate a continuous-time dynamic model of search and match between drivers and passengers. We assess the efficiency of the decentralized market by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012891967

Self-Selection in School Choice

Chen, Li - 2018

We study self-selection in centralized school choice, a strategy that takes place when students submit preferences …, students from low socioeconomic backgrounds are more likely to self-select. Second, some students self-select by mistake, and … exactly because of self-selection. Students from low socioeconomic backgrounds are particularly vulnerable to this type of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012935131

Matching in Platform Markets

Fung, Juan - 2018

We model platform markets with the matching-with-contracts framework. The solution concept in matching with contracts, stability, has a natural interpretation in platform markets. We use this framework to explore properties in these markets including seesaw principle and market tipping. Finally,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938659

Unpaired Kidney Exchange : Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money

Akbarpour, Mohammad - 2020

For an incompatible patient-donor pair, kidney exchanges often forbid receipt-before-donation (the patient receives a kidney before the donor donates) and donation-before-receipt, causing a double-coincidence-of-wants problem. Our proposal, the Unpaired kidney exchange algorithm, uses...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012823538

Deferred Acceptance is Minimally Manipulable

Van der Linden, Martin - 2017

This paper shows that the deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) cannot be improved upon in terms of manipulability in the sense of either Pathak and Sönmez (2013) or Arribillaga and Massó (2015) without compromising with stability. A conflict between manipulability and fairness is also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012969551

A Theory of Efficient Negotiations

Jackson, Matthew O. - 2016

structure of information is required: the same negotiation game works regardless of the setting. The theory and examples explore …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013005057

Gatekeeper Competition

Muller-Itten, Michele - 2020

I model access to influence as a two-sided matching market between a continuum of experts and two vertically differentiated gatekeepers under sequential directed search. Real-world examples include academic publishing, venture capital, job search or political agenda setting. The equilibrium is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852213

Welfare Theorems for Random Assignments with Priorities

Schlegel, Jan Christoph - 2020

We provide priority-constrained versions of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem for school choice lotteries. Moreover, we show that a constrained version of a cardinal second welfare theorem fails to hold, but can be restored for a relaxed notion of equilibrium with priority-specific prices

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853378

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