Using an extensive high-frequency data set, we investigate the transmission of financial crisis specifically focusing on the Panic of 1907, the final severe panic of the National Banking Era (1863-1913). We trace the transmission of the crisis from New York City trust companies to the New York...

Alexander Hamilton was the first U.S. Treasury Secretary from 1789 to 1795. When he started, the Federal Government was in default. During his tenure, U.S. Treasuries became the ultimate safe asset. He successfully managed expectations, achieved debt service reduction, and stabilized financial...

Claims to the contrary notwithstanding, tax havens existed long before the twentieth century. This paper explores one of them, mainland British North America. It shows that real estate tax capitalization/amortization was incomplete, so British investors could have engaged in tax arbitrage by...

I exploit variation in the adoption of disclosure and supervisory regulation across U.S. states to examine their impact on the development and stability of commercial banks. The empirical results suggest that the adoption of state‐level requirements to report financial statements in local...

We assess systematic risk in the U.S. banking system before and after the Panic of 1873 using a combination of linear programming and computational optimization to estimate the interbank network based upon total gross and net positions of national banks a week before the crisis. We impose...

In a recent article in the Economic History Review, Celia and Grubb liken colonial Maryland's dollar-denominated bills of credit to discount securities, circulating at less than their face value. This note argues that the bills in question circulated at par with specie and were treated as...

This is an unpublished comment on a Perkin's paper that surveyed banking in colonial America. It argues that historians have overlooked a number of abortive banking schemes in the colonies, implying that the absence of banks was not an "entrepreneurial failure." and that the extension of the...

We employ a new data set comprised of disaggregate figures on clearing house loan certificate issues in New York City to document how the dominant national banks were crucial providers of temporary liquidity during the Panic of 1907. Clearing house loan certificates were essentially ldquo;bridge...

President Jackson vetoed the bill to re-charter the Second Bank of the United States on 10 July 1832. I describe events leading to the veto and through the Bank’s dissolution in 1836 using private correspondence and official government documents. These sources reveal a political process...

The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 put the spotlight on the problem of too-big-to-fail (TBTF). The research conducted in this context has, however, generally focused on the econometric aspect and the contribution of the TBTF doctrine to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, while the economic...