We present a model in which some of the firm’s information (“newâ€) can be disclosed verifiably and some information (“typeâ€) cannot, to show that some firms may voluntarily withhold good news and disclose bad news. We describe an equilibrium in which high-type firms...

We test whether and how equity overvaluation affects corporate financing decisions using an ex ante misvaluation measure that filters firm scale and growth prospects from market price. We find that equity issuance and total financing increase with equity overvaluation; but only among overvalued...

We present a model in which some of the firm's information (" news") can be disclosed verifiably and some information (" type") cannot, to show that some firms may voluntarily withhold good news and disclose bad news. We describe an equilibrium in which high-type firms withhold good news and...

Purpose – Sometimes resources are badly employed because of coordination failures. Actions by decision makers that affect the likelihood of such failures are sometimes said to cause “systemic risk.” This paper seeks to consider the externality in the choice of ex ante risk management...