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In discrete exchange economies with possibly redundant and joint ownership, we propose new core notions in the conventional flavor by regarding endowments as rights to consume or trade with others. Our key idea is to identify self-enforcing coalitions and to redistribute their redundant property...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012839675
We consider a priority based allocation problem with general weak priorities. We focus on two strategy-proof mechanisms: the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism and the top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism. We give two conditions on weak priority structures whereby each of the DA mechanism and TTC...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012900300
Why do rational politicians choose inefficient policy instruments? Environmental regulation, for example, often takes the form of technology standards and quotas even when cost-effective Pigou taxes are available. To shed light on this puzzle, we present a stochastic game with multiple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902826
This paper shows that Smith has applied a wrong theory to explain public good financing. The result will be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011495
This paper shows how VL Smith has destroyed his own perfect theory. Smith used utility maximization to prove that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011497
For school choice (priority-based allocation) problems, when the priority structure is acyclic, the associated student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is Pareto efficient and group strategy-proof (Ergin, 2002). We reveal a hidden iterative removal structure behind such deferred...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853373
We observe that three salient solutions to matching, division and house allocation problems are not only (partially) strategy-proof, but (partially) group strategy-proof as well, in appropriate domains of definition. That is the case for the Gale-Shapley mechanism, the uniform rule and the top...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013033174
We study the slot allocation problem where agents have quasi-linear single-peaked preferences over slots and identify the rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. Since the quasi-linear single-peaked domain is not connected, the famous characterization of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013243117
Responsibility Debate?,” this Article applies the lessons of public choice theory to examine corporate social responsibility. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013062441
We study coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities, including marriage markets, roommate problems, and Shapley-Scarf housing markets as particular cases. When preferences are randomly determined, the probability of having a coalitionally stable solution is positively affected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013313691